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INTRODUCTION
Israelis and Zionists consider themselves to be returned natives, descen-
dants of the ancient Israelites that have returned to their native land after millen-
nia of wandering in foreign lands.  The Arabs and their supporters consider the
Zionist Jews who settled in Palestine to be settlers and Zionism to be a form of
settler colonialism comparable to apartheid in South Africa or the racism that
prevailed in settler colonies throughout South Africa.  This author considers both
sides to have many valid points:  Zionism has many features in common with set-
tler colonialist movements and it developed in unique circumstances that were
different from the settlement of the Americas, Africa, and Indonesia by
Europeans in the seventeenth to twentieth centuries.1
But by comparing the main practical features of Israeli politics with those
of many independent settler colonies, i.e., settler colonies controlled by the local
settlers rather than by a colonial metropole, it can be demonstrated that Israeli
politics are settler politics.  This article examines what the author considers to be
the six main distinguishing features of the Israeli political system and argues that
four of them are features of colonial settler regimes.  It then uses these four fea-
tures plus one of the two non-settler features to determine which settler colonies
are/were closest to Israel in terms of politics.
THE SIX DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF ISRAELI POLITICS
1. Israeli politics is characterized by numerous political parties in the
Knesset, which in turn results in weak coalition governments.
2. Israeli politics has powerful religious parties with no equivalent in the West
and comparable to Islamic parties in the Third World (Indonesia, Turkey).
3. Israeli politics is populated with many former senior military officers cre-
ating a class of Arab fighter politicians comparable to native fighter politi-
cians in the United States and South Africa.
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4. Israeli politics in the past had two important parties that were paramilitary
parties and the descendants of these two parties are the two main Israeli
parties.
5. The Arab question or native question has been the main issue in Israeli pol-
itics dividing parties of the left and right since before independence.
6. In Israel Jews and Arabs have a different legal status under formal law con-
stituting a legal distinction between settlers and natives.
The first two features are not features of most settler colonies and are the
ones most extensively dealt with in texts examining Israeli politics.  The final
four are dealt with in most texts on an ad hoc basis, with more emphasis on the
final two than on numbers three and four.  No one to this author’s knowledge
writes about Herut/Likud and Ahdut Ha’Avoda as paramilitary parties.  This arti-
cle will now consider in detail the importance of these six features.
Israeli politics is comparable to Italian politics from 1945 to the early
1990s or to the politics of the Third and Fourth French Republics.  All of these
systems were characterized by a form of proportional representation as the fran-
chise, which in turn produced numerous parties represented in the Israeli
Knesset.  Every single Israeli government has been a coalition government as no
single party has every won a majority in the Knesset.2 While Israel has tinkered
with the franchise in recent years by instituting a system of double voting for
both prime minister and party, the problem has only gotten worse rather than bet-
ter.3 And the small parties created by the system have a vested interest in its per-
petuation, making serious reform almost impossible.
Most British settler colonies had a two-party or three-party system result-
ing from the use of the first-past-the-post franchise system and single member
constituencies.4 Algeria under French rule had a multiparty system similar to the
Israeli system but it was integrated into the French political system and was not
independent – as in Northern Ireland.  So one cannot speak of an Algerian colo-
nial party political system.  Only two settler colonies have had functioning mul-
tiparty systems:  Northern Ireland and the United States in the 1850s.  Northern
Ireland has since the early 1970s had a political system with four main parties
and a number of smaller parties.  Since the early 1980s Northern Ireland has had
two main unionist (i.e., Protestant) parties, two main nationalist (i.e., Catholic)
parties, one medium sized nonsectarian party, and several splinter unionist par-
ties.5 The United States went from a three-party system in 1848 to a four-party
system in 1852, to a three-party system in 1856 to a four-party system in 1860
during the process of evolution from the Second Party System to the Third Party
System.6
No Western party is equivalent to the Israeli religious parties.  The closest
comparison in the West is with the Christian Democratic parties of Western
Europe (Germany, Italy) and Latin America (El Salvador, Venezuela).  But these
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parties are more interested in furthering what they perceive as religious values as
opposed to religious practices.  But because Judaism is much closer to Islam as
regards religious-civil relations, the closest equivalents are found in peaceful
Islamic parties that do not challenge the notion of a democratic system, but mere-
ly the degree of religion permitted in public.
Native-Fighter Politicians and Paramilitary Parties
Several Israeli and Jewish commentators and historians have declared the
degree of military penetration into Israeli politics to be unprecedented.  This is
true only as regards the degree:  two other countries have had a similar but less-
er penetration in their own histories.  I have dubbed these military politicians
native fighters – politicians who initially became famous by fighting the native
population of their country.  In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America these
politicians were known as Indian fighters; an Israeli maverick journalist once
dubbed Moshe Dayan as an Arab fighter and this author has used that term for
all former generals in the Knesset.7
America had four prominent Indian fighter politicians followed by a pair
of Mexican-fighters and finally a string of four Civil War generals in the post-
Civil War period.  As presidents they included those whom historians usually
name as the best (George Washington, Andrew Jackson) and the worst (Zachary
Taylor, Ulysses S. Grant, Ruthorford B. Hayes) presidents.  The Indian fighters
held sway over American politics from 1824 to 1850.8 The next decade was
dominated by veterans of the Mexican War and the period 1868 to 1893 was
dominated by Civil War veterans.   With the sole exceptions of Zachary Taylor
and Ulysses S. Grant, these American politicians were all professional politicians
who had careers in the militia or as the head of volunteer units during the Civil
War.  Only Taylor fits the Israeli pattern of having finished a long military career
before going into civilian politics as a presidential candidate in 1848.9
In addition to war heroes from the main wars at the national level, Indian
fighters dominated the politics of two states:  Tennessee and Texas.  Indian fight-
ers controlled the politics of Tennessee from statehood in 1789 until the mid-
1830s.  Several of the most important Indian-fighter politicians such as John
Sevier, Andrew Jackson, William Carroll, Sam Houston, and David Crockett,
came from Tennessee.  All the governors of the state in the 1820s were veterans
of the Creek War of 1813-14.  Texas featured a number of Indian fighters from
the time of the Texas Revolution in 1836 until 1893.  Most of these Indian-fight-
er politicians in both Tennessee and Texas had important civilian careers as land
speculators, lawyers, doctors, and entrepreneurs.  Both states had conflicts with
the native population that lasted for decades:  Tennessee with the Cherokee,
Creek, and Chickasaw Indians from the 1770s until 1814, and Texas with the
Lipan, Karakawa, and Cherokee in the 1830s and with the Comanche from 1836
to 1875.10
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The South African Republic (SAR-Zuid Afrikansee Republik) located
between the Vaal and Limpopo Rivers and between Bechuanaland and
Mozambique and Swaziland, existed from 1859 to 1900 when it was brought to
an end by a British invasion in the Second Anglo-Boer War.  Its history can be
neatly divided into two periods:  from 1859 to British annexation in 1877 and
from 1880 to 1900.   Both periods were dominated by three important African
fighter politicians:  Paul Kruger, Marius W. Pretorius, and Pieter Joubert.  Kruger
and Pretorius dominated the politics of the first period with Pretorius serving as
president and Kruger as commandant general or a cross between defense minis-
ter and chief of staff.  Following three years of British rule the triumvirate lead a
successful short war of independence with Joubert, the commanding general dur-
ing the war, serving as commandant general during the next 20 years and Kruger
as president.  Joubert was also the leader of the opposition Progressive Party, the
Transvaal branch of the Cape Colony’s Afrikaner Bund.  The ruling council of
the SAR also probably contained many more African fighter politicians as the
Boers were involved in a series of wars with the various African tribes living in
the Transvaal right up until 1898.11
The neighboring Orange Free State (Vrystaat), located between the Orange
and Vaal Rivers from 1852 to 1900, may also have contained a class of African
fighter politicians.  But it, like Texas, quickly developed a professional class
from which its politicians came.  Its wars with the natives ended in the 1870s,
giving less scope for a long-term native fighter class to develop.12
Like the United States after its civil war, South Africa developed a class of
civil war general politicians among the Afrikaners.  Three generals – Louis
Botha, Jan Christian Smuts, James Barry Hertzog – dominated the politics of the
Union of South Africa from 1910 until 1948.  Botha and Smuts were leaders of
the biethnic South Africa Party and Hertzog was leader of the Afrikaner National
Party.  Following a period of coalition government the two parties merged in
1934 to form the United Party, but a number of Hertzog’s followers left in 1939
to form the Afrikaner Party following South Africa’s declaration of war on
Germany.  Botha died in office in 1919; Hertzog retired from politics in
September 1939, and Smuts was defeated by Daniel Malan and the National
Party in 1948.13
South Africa had a third “class” of military politicians in the 1980-94 peri-
od.  Former chief of staff Magnus Malan was appointed defense minister in 1980
and remained in that position until 1991 when he became a minor cabinet mem-
ber during the transition De Klerk government following the Inkathagate politi-
cal scandal. Malan had been in charge of operations in Namibia during the early
part of that war and had commanded the incursion into Angola in 1975. Another
chief of staff, Constand Viljoen, became leader of the Afrikaner opposition in the
1994 majority rule elections.  Viljoen had been chief of staff during the early
1980s and helped plan many of South Africa’s biggest cross-border raids.  Malan
owed his appointment to his relationship with Premier P. W. Botha and was more
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a representative of the military – the “securocrats” – than  a  popular politician
in his own right.  But Malan was considered a serious presidential candidate
within the National Party to succeed P.W. Botha during the late 1980s.  Viljoen
was popular but the Afrikaner right did very poorly in the elections.14
No other settler colonies or colonial powers or  Western democracies
developed a class of military politicians.  Spain was the only country with a class
of military politicians, veterans of fighting in Spanish Morocco from 1911 to
1925, but they came to power through the Spanish Civil War rather than through
election.15
Israel has had major Arab fighter politicians in electoral politics since 1955
when Ahdut Ha’Avoda elected Moshe Carmel and Yigal Allon to parliament.
Initially, Israel followed the American model of only electing popular war
heroes, but this changed over time.  Today, it is almost automatic for a retiring
chief of staff to go into politics and many major generals go into politics as well
in either the two main parties, Labor and Likud, or in the smaller right-wing par-
ties, such as Moledet and Tzomet, or in centrist lists, like the Democratic
Movement for Change and the Center Party.  Neither the United States nor South
Africa ever had as large a military class in electoral politics at any one time as in
Israel today.16 Israel has had three Arab fighter prime ministers:  Yitzhak Rabin
(1974-77, 1992-95), Ehud Barak (1999-2001), and Ariel Sharon (2001-present).
Arguably, Benyamin Netanyahu was also an Arab fighter as he served in an elite
commando unit beside Barak and ran as an anti-terrorist expert in 1996.17
These three countries all have three things in common.  First, they are all
independent countries with a mainly immigrant (or descended from immigrants)
population.  Second, they had a prolonged conflict with the native population of
their countries.  Third, they developed a militia system from which their native-
fighter politicians sprang rather than a professional army.  America’s Indian wars
of the West between 1866 and 1890 produced no Indian-fighter politicians, part-
ly because the connection with the militia had been broken and partly because no
great populations were affected by the Indians.  Politics was also full of Civil
War veterans at this time.18
Israel’s two main political parties are both partially descended from para-
military parties.  I define paramilitary party as a party that is either the political
wing of a paramilitary (guerrilla/terrorist) group or the continuation of such a
group in political form.  In the 1940s there were three Zionist paramilitary organ-
izations in mandatory Palestine: Hagana/Palmach, the Irgun Zvai Leumi
(National Military Organization or Etzel) and the Lohemei Herut Israel (Fighters
for the Freedom of Israel or Lehi).  The Hagana was the official militia of the
Jewish Agency with Palmach being the standing army of 2,000 to 3,000 from
1941 to 1948 recruited from the Hagana.  The Etzel was the underground mili-
tia of the Revisionist movement founded in the 1930s from the Revisionist youth
movement, Betar.  Lehi was a 1940 radical right splinter from Etzel.  
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In 1948-49, two paramilitary parties emerged to contest the elections to the
First Knesset.  In June 1948, Etzel leader Menahem Begin announced the cre-
ation of Herut as the extension of the Etzel and began forming local branches.
Begin then made a hostile takeover of the existing Revisionist Party so that his
party had the support of both Revisionists and underground veterans.  In late
1948, Lehi formed the Fighter’s List after being banned following the assassina-
tion of United Nations mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in September.  Herut
emerged as the third largest party and the Fighter’s List won only a single seat,
but it did spring its leader from prison – which was its intended purpose.  The
Fighter’s List disappeared as a party before the elections to the Second Knesset
in 1951.  Yitzhak Shamir devoted only half a page to the party in his memoirs
and wrote dismissively, “It was obvious to me from the start that now Lehi, its
goals met, had no platform, nothing to say, its members, for the most part, not
having much in common.”19
For the next 20 years the Central Committee of Herut was almost identical
to the Etzel’s Executive Committee and the party was known as “the fighting
family.”  This only began to change in the 1970s as Ezer Weizman challenged
Begin for the leadership and Yitzhak Shamir, one of the three leaders of Lehi was
brought into the party along with the Lehi’s radio announcer, Geula Cohen.  In
1973, Herut merged with the Liberal Party, the State List, and the Free Center to
form the Likud (union). The latter two parties merged into a single faction,
La’am, which was eventually absorbed by the two larger factions.  Eventually, in
the mid-1980s the Likud changed from an electoral alliance to a proper party.  By
the time the Likud won power in 1977 it was largely a paramilitary party only at
the leadership level and in underground veterans’ families forming an important
part of its core constituency.   Until 1992, the Likud was led by a former under-
ground leader:  first by Begin until September 1983 and then by Shamir.  After
1992, it completely ceased to be a paramilitary party.20
Israel’s other paramilitary party was Ahdut Ha’Avoda (the unity of labor)
formed in 1954 as a splinter from Mapam, the leading opposition party.  Mapam
had been formed from a merger of  two different kibbutz (collective settlements),
the Mishmar HaTzair and Kibbutz HaMeuhad movements, and had also includ-
ed the leadership of the Palmach.  The Palmach, consisting of three brigades,
was dismantled by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in October 1948.  Ben-
Gurion then helped to force the former leader of the Palmach, Yigal Allon, out
of the Israeli army in 1951.  The new party was headed by ideologist Yitzhak
Tabenkin and three military leaders:  Allon, Moshe Carmel, and Israel Galili.
Galili had been an important administrator within the Hagana and had been its
chief of staff before the Israeli army was formed in May 1948.  Galili continued
as deputy defense minister until September 1948 when he resigned due to dif-
ferences with Ben-Gurion who was defense minister as well as prime minister.
Allon had been the leading battlefield commander in the 1948 War of
Independence having been in command of offensives in the north (April-May
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1948), and then front commander of first the Central Front and then the Southern
Front.  Carmel was commander of the Northern Front from July 1948 to the end
of the war.  So de facto Ahdut Ha’Avoda was Israel’s second major paramilitary
party and its first Arab fighter party.  Ahdut Ha’Avoda merged with rival Mapai
and Mapai splinter-party, Rafi to form the Israel Labor Party in 1968.  The three
component factions dissolved into two personal factions supporting Moshe
Dayan and Yigal Allon following the death of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in
February 1969.  At this point the Labor Party as a whole became an Arab fight-
er party.21
Only two other Western democracies have had paramilitary parties:  the
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom – the latter only within Northern
Ireland.22 In Ireland the two factions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that
fought the Irish civil war in 1922-23, eventually formed separate parties that
eventually became the two main parties in Ireland, Fianna Fail (warriors of des-
tiny) and Fine Gael (band of Gaels).  Later, smaller groups would emerge from
the IRA to form smaller parties.  Until the emergence of the Workers’ Party in
both Ireland and Northern Ireland in the early 1980s, all of these parties followed
the Israeli pattern of being extensions of a former paramilitary group rather than
being the political arm of that group.  Although the IRA continued to exist, Liam
de Valera split from it when he formed Fianna Fail in 1927.  
The Workers’ Party was a unique case because the Official IRA from which
it emerged had agreed to a ceasefire in May 1972, but had never disbanded nor
decommissioned its weapons, and had continued to engage in criminal activities.
Some of its revenues probably financed the political activities of the Workers’
Party.  The Workers’ Party managed to elect a few councilors to local councils
but was never successful in electing members to the provincial assemblies or to
parliament in London.  In Ireland most of its membership split in 1992 to form a
new party, the Democratic Left, in protest over continued links to the Official
IRA.  This party then became another paramilitary party of the traditional Irish
sort.
In Northern Ireland three paramilitary parties emerged in the late 1970s
and early 1980s:  what eventually became the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP)
and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) in 1978, and Sinn Fein in 1981-82.
Sinn Fein had always existed as the public relations arm of the Provisional IRA.
In 1981, it ran two candidates from prison for a vacant parliamentary seat in
Fermanagh-Tyrone in a by-election.  Hunger striker Bobby Sands won the seat,
but died of self-inflicted starvation shortly afterwards.  His election agent then
won the seat.  This gave Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams the confidence to con-
test assembly and parliamentary elections in 1982 and 1983.  Until the
Provisional IRA’s ceasefire in August 1994, Sinn Fein averaged about one-third
of the nationalist vote in Northern Ireland elections to two-thirds for the Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).  In the local elections in 2001, Sinn Fein
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emerged as the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland for the first time.  The
assembly election in November 2003 seems to have confirmed that Sinn Fein is
now permanently the leading nationalist party in Northern Ireland.23
The UDP and the PUP were the parties respectively of the two main loyal-
ist (Protestant) paramilitary organizations:  the Ulster Defence Association and
the Ulster Volunteer Force.  Both remained marginal until they helped to arrange
the loyalist ceasefire in October 1994.  Both parties managed to elect members
to the 1996 Forum, due to the special “topping up” feature that gave the 10
largest parties two extra seats each (it was designed expressly to give the loyal-
ists representation).  Between them they won nearly ten (9.7) percent of the vote
in 1996.  The UDP failed to win any seats in the 1998 assembly election, but the
PUP won two seats in Belfast and emerged as a key ally of Ulster Unionist Party
leader David Trimble.  The PUP was led by former UVF prisoners whereas the
UDP was led by the son of the founder of the UDA’s armed wing – the  Ulster
Freedom Fighters – Gary McMichael (son of John McMichael who was assassi-
nated in 1987).  Gary McMichael lacked personal paramilitary experience and
was not taken seriously by the paramilitary leadership – the “brigadiers” – of the
UDA.  In late 2001, the UDA ordered the party closed down and McMichael
retired from politics.  A senior party figure, John White – a convicted double
murderer – followed renegade UDA leader Johnny Adair in the latter’s feud with
the UDA’s leadership in 2003.24 In November 2003, Billy Hutchinson lost his
assembly seat in North Belfast leaving David Ervine as the party’s only assem-
bly member.  The PUP was reduced to less than two percent of the total assem-
bly vote.  
Although Herut has more in common with the Irish parties (including its
famous princes who were also a feature of Irish politics), it has in common with
the loyalist parties a support base in the urban slums of the large cities.25 The
PUP is strongest  in the housing estates of North and East Belfast and the UDP
was strongest in the housing estates of Lisburn and Newtonabbey, whereas Herut
was strongest in south Tel Aviv and the development towns of Israel.  First Herut
and then Likud became the party of the urban underclass in Israel.26
The Native Question and Discrimination
The next two features provide further evidence that Israeli politics are set-
tler politics.  Since the emergence of the Revisionist Party led by Vladimir
“Ze’ev” Jabotinsky in 1925 and the creation of a separate Revisionist Zionist
movement in 1934, the native question has been the dominant question in Israeli
politics.  In Israel the native question and the territorial question are nearly the
same as the latter involves bringing along the population of the territories incor-
porated within Israel or ruled over by it.  The Revisionists and their Herut suc-
cessors opposed both of the partition plans proposed for settlement of the
Palestine question.  The hymn of the Betar youth movement was “Both Banks of
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the Jordan,” which asserted Zionist claims to Transjordan as well as Cisjordan.
By the mid-1960s when Herut formed Gahal with the Liberal Party, it had given
up its claims to Transjordan but continued to insist that if Israel ever gained con-
trol of the West Bank it should keep it.  Only under Ariel Sharon has the Likud
spoken publicly in support of the creation of a Palestinian state, and Sharon is
offering terms that he knows the Palestine Liberation Organization would never
accept.
Likewise, in South Africa and Northern Ireland it was the native question
that divided the main parties.  The 1948 election in South Africa was fought on
the basis of the native question:  the National Party’s apartheid or the United
Party’s traditional segregation policy.  The Herstigte National Party (Purified
National Party) split from the National Party in 1969 over relaxation of petty
apartheid restrictions and the Conservative Party split in 1982 over parliamentary
representation for “coloreds” (mixed-race) and Indians.  From 1959 the
Progressive Party and its successors challenged the National Party over its home-
land policy and the question of first a qualified franchise for blacks and then
majority rule.  Only after majority rule in 1994 was the Democratic Party reward-
ed by the white electorate for having a more realistic policy and being a better
opposition by becoming the main white party.27
In Northern Ireland the native question among unionists has been fought
along the grounds of simple majority rule versus power-sharing with nationalists.
Power-sharing was attempted in 1974 by Prime Minister (and former Ulster
Unionist Party [UUP] leader) Brian Faulkner, but it was defeated by over-
whelming unionist opposition and a loyalist general strike backed by the loyalist
paramilitaries.  For the next 20 years Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) pulled the UUP to the right.28 Now unionist politics is fought over the
issue of support for the April 1998 Good Friday Agreement that initiated power-
sharing with nationalists in exchange for paramilitary ceasefires, decommission-
ing, and an end to the Republic of Ireland’s legal claim over Northern Ireland.
The UUP is presently deeply divided internally over the Agreement and a major-
ity of unionists reject the Agreement because of the failure of paramilitaries –
especially the Republicans – to decommission and cease their activities.  In
November 2003, three leading anti-agreement members of the UUP defected to
the DUP after being confronted by leader David Trimble over their continued
refusal to support party policy.29
Not only does Israel parallel settler colonies in the existence of a native
question, but also in its solution to the native question.  In the independent set-
tler colonies of Southern Africa – Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa – and
Northern Ireland internal settlements were attempted as a solution to end the
armed struggle conducted by the liberation movements.30 An internal settlement
is any political settlement with internal native leaders that by-passes the external
leaders connected with the armed struggle on terms more favorable to the settlers
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than what the liberation movements are demanding at the time.  Its main pur-
poses are to win both foreign and internal support by demonstrating moderation
and coopting native leaders.  All internal settlements have failed to win long-term
popular support for the settlers or colonial power and the foreign support won has
proved insufficient to win the war.31 The internal leaders can be either tradition-
al leaders that have already been coopted (Namibia, South Africa) or nationalist
leaders formerly connected with the armed struggle or with trade unionism
(Namibia, Rhodesia).  In the latter case the internal leaders might attempt to con-
vince the settlers that they will cause massive defections from the armed strug-
gle.32 In South Africa the regime attempted two internal settlements:  the first in
1983-84 with coloreds and Indians was unsuccessful, and the second with town-
ship councilors failed to get off the ground.  The opposition negotiated an inter-
nal settlement in Natal in 1986, but it was never implemented due to opposition
from the government. 
In Israel the Likud attempted an internal settlement by creating the Village
Leagues as an alternate Palestinian leadership in the territories in 1981.  The
Leagues never managed to win the support of more than about one to two per-
cent of the population and were quickly destroyed when the Intifada began in
December 1987.  Village League leaders became targets of Palestinian mobs and
gunmen as Israeli collaborators.33
From 1967 to 1988 the Labor Party had as its official native policy two dif-
ferent variations of the “Jordanian option”:  the Allon Plan or territorial compro-
mise, and the Dayan Plan or functional compromise.  The former involved a par-
tition with Jordan getting the populated portions of the West Bank and Israel get-
ting the unpopulated Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea’s northwestern shoreline.
Jordan would have also received control of the Gaza Strip and a corridor con-
necting the two territories. The Israeli portion of the Allon Plan partition
involved between a third and 40 percent of the West Bank.  The Dayan Plan
involved Israel remaining in military control of  all the West Bank and Gaza, but
Jordan taking administrative and political control and electing representatives to
the parliament in Amman.  King Hussein of Jordan rejected both versions of the
Jordanian compromise and told Israeli leaders so repeatedly in secret meetings
from 1967 to 1977.34 But in practice Jordan cooperated with Israeli control of
the West Bank and a modified form of functional compromise existed informal-
ly.  The Jordanian option never became Labor Party policy before Dayan left the
party in 1977, but it did influence the location of Israeli settlements in the West
Bank with Israel Galili working with Dayan to form settlement policy.35 The
Jordanian option was finally dropped as Labor Party policy after King Hussein
publicly renounced any interest in the West Bank in July 1988.  The Jordanian
option was not an internal settlement per se as it did not involve Palestinians, but
it was in the spirit of the internal settlement in that it was meant to avoid negoti-
ations with the external nationalists of the PLO.36
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Before independence in 1948, the Jewish Agency purchased land in the
name of the Jewish People.  Subsequently, this land and land taken over by Israel
in 1948-49 became available for use only by Jews.  This remains in effect today.
Arabs lived under martial law and military control from 1948 to 1966 and had
few civil rights other than the right to vote.  The Law of Return allows any Jew
to immigrate to Israel and quickly become an Israeli citizen while Palestinian
refugees are barred from returning.  These various laws created a formal legal
differentiation between native and settler, Arab and Jew,  that has lessened since
1966 but still remains today.  Spending on Arabs per capita is also much lower
than spending on Jews in Israel.  This has resulted in lower educational and hous-
ing standards for Arabs.37
Israel is clearly not a liberal democracy in the usual sense that Western
European and North American countries are.  It can be compared to the American
South before the civil rights era when blacks were excluded from politics and
few blacks had the right to vote or to Northern Ireland under home rule from
1922 to 1972 when Catholics suffered from discrimination in housing and
employment, and were outvoted in local councils, even in areas where Catholics
were the majority through gerrymandered electoral districts.38 In both the United
States and Northern Ireland discrimination is illegal, but persists and the effects
of past discrimination will remain for a long time.
Individually, these four characteristics of Israeli politics are not evidence
of settler politics.  Many, if not most countries, have some sort of discrimination
against certain ethnic or religious groups.  But characteristic three – native-fight-
er politicians – is found exclusively among settler colonies and characteristic
four – paramilitary parties – is found in only two cases besides Israel with one
being a settler colony.  Characteristic five – native question – is the defining fea-
ture of settler politics and the fact that Israel used a similar approach is telling.
If we examine other settler colonies we see that not all of them have all of these
characteristics.  Most settler colonies, including Northern Ireland, lack native-
fighter politicians (see below for further discussion of this). Most settler
colonies, including South Africa, lack paramilitary parties.  But they all have
characteristics five and six – the native question and legal discrimination.  
Which Settler Colony is the Best Model for Comparison With Israel
Having determined that Israel has settler politics and has a prolonged con-
flict with an organized native opponent we can narrow the field down consider-
ably.  We will begin by eliminating the settler colonies that were either depend-
ent settler colonies controlled by a colonial metropole rather than the local set-
tlers (with the important exception of Northern Ireland) or were nondemocratic.
The native-settler conflict was over militarily in Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand by the time they gained independence.  This leaves Rhodesia, Namibia,
Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the United States.  Rhodesia, Namibia, and
Winter 2004
146
South Africa were all minority settler colonies where the settlers were a minori-
ty of the country’s population.  This leaves us with Northern Ireland and the
United States, which like Israel are majority settler colonies where the settlers are
a majority.
The United States, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the
conflict with the native population was still in its military phase, is useful for
comparing with Israel when looking at civil-military interactions.  The United
States faced a native population that was divided along ethnic lines, with many
Indians siding with the settlers against different ethnic groups.  This allowed the
United States to defeat the natives in stages, by implementing a policy of divide
and conquer.  Such was also the case in Southern Africa during the conquest
phase.  However, Israel cannot expect to negotiate a peace treaty with the
Palestinians in the same fashion that the United States negotiated treaties with
the Indians.  By the 1850s, when America had its only multiparty phase, the
native question was not a major issue except in Florida and the Pacific
Northwest.  The native problem had been resolved east of the Mississippi River
through “transfer” a decade previously.  This left slavery as the major issue.  This
had a territorial dimension with the debate over the admission of new territories
as the dividing issue between the main parties, similar to the territorial issue in
Israel.  Like the Labor Party before 1992, the Whig Party was divided on the
issue of the territories.39
If we look at the international context we see the contemporaneous South
African, Middle East, and Northern Ireland conflicts taking place under similar
circumstances.  The South African conflict has been resolved and the Northern
Ireland conflict is in the process of being resolved with a peace agreement nego-
tiated but only partially implemented.  The South African conflict is like the
Middle Eastern conflict in two important aspects:  the PLO, like the African
National Congress (ANC), is an official liberation movement enjoying wide-
spread international and regional legitimacy; and both conflicts involved a set of
confrontation states supporting the liberation movement.  Israel and South Africa
(and Rhodesia) employed similar strategies of raiding their neighbors in order to
discourage support for the liberation movements and to prevent the countries
from being used as support zones for training guerrillas/terrorists and launching
incursions into their states.  South Africa enjoyed greater success resulting from
the its economic leverage over its neighbors due to colonial era transportation
infrastructure.  Israel had close military ties with South Africa in the 1970s and
1980s and may have advised South Africa directly on raiding tactics.  Certainly
Israeli raids in the 1950s and 1970s served as inspiration to military planners in
Rhodesia and South Africa.40
In Northern Ireland the IRA had no safe zone.  It had no sanctuary in the
Republic of Ireland where it was illegal and its rival SDLP received the support
of the Irish government.  Only pariah Libya supplied arms to the IRA.
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Consequently, the IRA was an outlaw liberation movement.  This only changed
with the IRA’s ceasefire in August 1994 when both the IRA and the loyalist para-
militaries were brought in from the cold by Dublin.  But otherwise the IRA and
the PLO are very similar.  Both have maximalist territorial ambitions against the
settler states and both have been willing to use terrorism to further their cause.
As well, both the republicans in Northern Ireland and the Palestinians have been
deeply divided over the question of making a negotiated peace with their settler
opponents.  The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and Continuity IRA
opposed any negotiated settlement and the IRA split on the issue with the orga-
nization’s former quartermaster leading a group of hardliners out of the IRA to
form the Real IRA.  These three dissident republican organizations then con-
ducted their own terrorist campaign until the August 1998 Omagh bombing
demonstrated that there was no popular support for this.41
In Palestine the PLO split over the Oslo accords with most of the front
organizations (PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, PFLP-SC) opposing the peace agreement
and remaining in Damascus.  But more serious for Israel was the opposition of
Hamas and Islamic Jihad to the peace.  Both conducted terror campaigns
throughout the period of the Oslo process.42
In both Israel and Northern Ireland the settler population was deeply divid-
ed over the peace agreements and opposition to the agreements grew as the ter-
rorist groups increased their attacks on the population.  In Northern Ireland
approximately 55 percent of the unionist population voted in favor of the Good
Friday Agreement in a referendum the following month.  By the time the
Agreement was suspended by the British government in response to protests by
the UUP in October 2002 this had been reduced to about a third of the unionist
population.43
In South Africa there were also demographic and economic pressures on
the white minority that were much greater than those faced by Israel or Northern
Ireland.  Neither Israel nor the United Kingdom confronted organized economic
sanctions by their main trading partners.  South Africa faced sanctions by both
the European Community and the United States starting in 1986.  The whites also
knew that they would be an ever smaller portion of the population as time went
by due to the higher African birthrate.  By the end of the century whites were less
than ten percent of the population of the country.  
If one adds the multiparty system to the mix then Northern Ireland is clear-
ly the best model for Israel.  And the other nonsettler characteristic – religious
parties – also favors Northern Ireland. The DUP is the closest thing in the West
to a religious party similar to those in Israel. The DUP is based on Ian Paisley’s
Free Presbyterian Church, which he founded as a young man in 1951, with the
leader being both a religious and political leader.44 This is similar to the role of
leaders in Shas and other Israeli religious parties.  When Ian Paisley retires as
party leader and is replaced by Peter Robinson or Nigel Dodds, this similarity
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will end.  The DUP is in Israeli terms a hybrid cross between the Likud and Shas
– a party designed to implement both the religious rulings of its leader and to
struggle for supremacy within the unionist community.  Paisley is a fundamen-
talist, anti-Catholic minister stuck in the battles of the sixteenth-century refor-
mation and the seventeenth-century struggle for Ireland.  His party is based
throughout Northern Ireland, particularly in rural areas where it draws largely on
the membership of his church.  The party is an alliance of evangelical Protestants
– mostly Free Presbyterians – and urban secular activists.45
Northern Ireland is also a borderline case of a native-fighter politician
class.  John W. Nixon, a police detective, widely suspected of involvement in
sectarian murders of Catholics in reprisal killings in 1920-22 served on the
Belfast City Council from 1925-49 and in the Stormont provincial parliament
from 1929 until his death in 1949.  Sir Basil Brooke, Viscount Brookeborough
after 1952, was a British army captain during the First World War and played an
instrumental role in the creation of the Ulster Special Constabulary (which later
became the Royal Ulster Constabulary) as a paramilitary police force in 1920.
He also played a role in defending against an IRA invasion of Fermanagh in
1922.  He served in Stormont from 1929 until 1968 and was a cabinet member
for years before being elected prime minister in 1943, a position that he held for
the next 20 years.  A new class of Irish fighters emerged in the Ulster Unionist
Party in the 1980s as several majors in the Ulster Defense Regiment were elect-
ed to the parliament or the assembly.  These include  John Taylor, deputy leader
of the UUP; Ken Maginnis, who was a candidate for party leadership in 1995;
and Sam Foster, who served as an assembly member in the 1998-2002 assembly.
Maginnis was the only one of the three whose public career was identified with
the security forces.  He was elected to parliament in 1983 and retired in 2001
retaining only his council seat.  He, like many of the Arab fighters in the Labor
Party, was a champion of  peace with the native population while a dedicated
opponent of the liberation movement.  He backed the Good Friday Agreement
and Trimble with all his heart but refused to speak directly to leading members
of Sinn Fein.46
The only major drawback in this comparison is the fact that Northern
Ireland is a dependent settler colony – London has a veto over all decisions and
Northern Ireland has experienced direct rule from March 1972 to January 1974
and from May 1974 to June 1998 and intermittently since then.  But unlike most
dependent settler colonies, Northern Ireland has its own party political system
and was de facto an independent settler colony from 1922 to 1972.47 As Israel is
a client state of America, Washington exercises a similar influence over
Jerusalem to that of London over Belfast.  Because of Israel’s influence within
Congress, the executive takes Israeli interests into account when formulating its
proposals for resolving the conflict.48
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CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, Zionist politics within Israel are similar to set-
tler politics within settler colonies experiencing a native-settler conflict.  Arabs
and their supporters have most often compared Israel to Algeria and South
Africa.  This is understandable in terms of their purposes.  Algeria is the one set-
tler colonial conflict where Arabs have won and it was an inspiration to many lib-
eration movements in the 1960s including the PLO.  But it was a dependent set-
tler colony and fantasizing that Israel was another Algeria allowed the PLO to
ignore the Israeli public while concentrating on relations with first Moscow and
then Washington.  The consequences have been decades of continued exile,
occupation, and terrorism.  South Africa is used because it lacks all legitimacy
with even the white population of South Africa making anti-apartheid com-
ments.49
However, both Algeria and South Africa are minority settler colonies.  The
only suitable model for Israel is Northern Ireland. And Northern Ireland is the
only settler colony with its own multiparty system.  Both are also similar in that
neither is a typical settler colony in terms of its history.  Both unionists and
Zionists resent being labeled settlers.50
Potential mediators and policymakers for the Middle East should study
why the parties were successful in negotiating a peace agreement in Northern
Ireland and why they failed to implement it in four years of trying.  As long as
there is no peace in Northern Ireland it is unrealistic to expect one in the Middle
East.  Northern Ireland lacks major foreign opposition to peace in the form of the
supply of arms and funding to terrorist groups from external powers.  Yet it has
been unable to implement peace.  In November 2003, the DUP became the lead-
ing unionist party and Sinn Fein the leading nationalist party.  The emergence of
either to leadership status in its community would probably have been enough to
kill the peace process; the emergence of both certainly ended the prospects for
peace as their visions of peace are mutually incompatible.  David Trimble’s lead-
ership within the UUP is also endangered, threatening to leave the peace process
without a unionist champion.51
Peace was negotiated in Northern Ireland because it was ripe for peace and
because the dual mediation of the British and Irish governments was effective.52
Until the Bush administration, Washington was the only effective mediator in the
Middle East conflict.  President Clinton failed to mediate successfully in the
summer of 2000, partially because the Palestinians considered him to be
biased.53 President Bush failed to take mediation seriously until the summer of
2003 with the roadmap plan.  By then the situation was no longer ripe for peace.
The European Union is interested in mediating in the Middle East.  This will
involve learning how to work effectively with Washington as Dublin did with
London.    
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Inside Israel the various political parties can learn from the experience of
native-fighter politicians in the United States.  Israel presently faces none of the
factors that put an end to the era of the Indian-fighter politicians in America.54
One Indian-fighter politician, Andrew Jackson, implemented “transfer” of the
native population as his country’s leader.  He thought it was in the best long-term
interest of the Indians.55 A man of very similar personality is the prime minister
in Israel.56 He may face even greater pressures to deal with the leadership of the
PLO.  
It was the Indian fighters like Jackson and William H. Harrison that nego-
tiated with the Indians after the War of 1812.  It has been Arab fighters who have
negotiated with the Arabs since 1949.  A look at their record would suggest that
they are more imaginative and pragmatic than their civilian counterparts.57
When peace is finally negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians, it will prob-
ably be an Arab fighter doing the negotiating from the Israeli side.  
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